October 22nd Lower Shoshone starting to show signs of recovering! After some horrendous years of high water, destroying stream side vegetation that shades the river, chemical spills, and sedimentation issues the Lower Shoshone is trying to adapt and recover. With 2 years in a row of supper high flows one of the positive things that has happened is that the river bottom is as clean as I've ever seen it. There are still some areas of the super heavy sediment here and there but the majority of the river from Buffalo Bill to Powell is looking good.
Wheelonphysicist and developer of Central Intelligence Agency 's aerial surveillance program Charles E. Yeagerretired Air Force general and the first person to break the sound barrier in level flight Findings[ edit ] The Space Shuttle solid rocket booster field joint assembly from the Rogers Commission report The commission found that the Challenger accident was caused by a failure in the O-rings sealing the aft field joint on the right solid rocket booster, causing pressurized hot gases and eventually flame to "blow by" the O-ring and contact the adjacent external tank, causing structural failure.
The failure of the O-rings was attributed to a design flaw, as their performance could be too easily compromised by factors including the low temperature on the day of launch. Most salient was the failure of both NASA and its contractor, Morton Thiokolto respond adequately to the design flaw.
The Commission found that as early asNASA managers had not only known about the flawed O-ring, but that it had the potential for catastrophe. This led the Rogers Commission to conclude that the Challenger disaster was "an accident rooted in history". There was a meeting the night before the launch to discuss any major pressing issues that might delay the launch further.
This was done in large part because of the management structure at NASA and the lack of major checks and balances, which proved to be fatal in this scenario. It stays the same dimension.
Recovering from identity theft is a process. Here’s step-by-step advice that can help you limit the damage, report identity theft, and fix your credit. Writing an Insurance Claim Letter for Flood Damage (with Sample) Use this sample insurance claim letter as a template for your formal notification. Rising waters and flood damage can cost tens of thousands of dollars to repair. Form CP – 8/01 This is a Sample Report C.L.U.E.® Personal Property How to Read Your Report C.L.U.E., the Comprehensive Loss Underwriting Exchange, is a claim history information exchange developed by ChoicePoint.
In other words, for a few seconds at least and more seconds than that, there is no resilience in this particular material when it is at a temperature of 32 degrees.
His style of investigating with his own direct methods rather than following the commission schedule put him at odds with Rogers, who once commented, "Feynman is becoming a real pain. His interviews of NASA's high-ranking managers revealed startling misunderstandings of elementary concepts.
One such how to write a water damage report sample was the determination of a safety factor. These O-rings provided the gas-tight seal needed between the vertically stacked cylindrical sections that made up the solid fuel booster.
NASA managers recorded this result as demonstrating that the O-rings had a "safety factor" of 3.
This shopping feature will continue to load items. In order to navigate out of this carousel please use your heading shortcut key to navigate to the next or previous heading. The Online Writing Lab (OWL) at Purdue University houses writing resources and instructional material, and we provide these as a free service of the Writing Lab at Purdue. The Rogers Commission Report was created by a Presidential Commission charged with investigating the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster during its 10th mission, timberdesignmag.com report, released and submitted to President Ronald Reagan on 9 June , both determined the cause of the disaster that took place 73 seconds after liftoff, and urged NASA to improve and install new safety features on the.
Feynman incredulously explains the magnitude of this error: To paraphrase Feynman's example, if engineers built a bridge that could bear 3, pounds without any damage, even though it was never expected to bear more than 1, pounds in practice, the safety factor would be 3.
If a 1, pound truck drove across the bridge and it cracked at all, even just a third of the way through a beam, the safety factor is now zero: Feynman continued to investigate the lack of communication between NASA's management and its engineers, and was struck by management's claim that the risk of catastrophic malfunction on the shuttle was 1 in ; i.
Feynman immediately realized that this claim was risible on its face; as he described, this assessment of risk would entail that NASA could expect to launch a shuttle every day for the next years while suffering, on average, only one accident.
Investigating the claim further, Feynman discovered that the 1 in figure was stating what they claimed that the failure rate ought to be, given that it was a manned vehicle, and working backwards to generate the failure rate of components.
First, NASA management assigned a probability of failure to each individual bolt, sometimes claiming a probability of 1 in ; that is, one in one hundred million.
Feynman pointed out that it is impossible to calculate such a remote possibility with any scientific rigor.
Secondly, Feynman was bothered not just by this sloppy science but by the fact that NASA claimed that the risk of catastrophic failure was "necessarily" 1 in As the figure itself was beyond belief, Feynman questioned exactly what "necessarily" meant in this context—did it mean that the figure followed logically from other calculations, or did it reflect NASA management's desire to make the numbers fit?
He then decided to poll the engineers themselves, asking them to write down an anonymous estimate of the odds of shuttle explosion. Feynman found that the bulk of the engineers' estimates fell between 1 in 50 and 1 in Not only did this confirm that NASA management had clearly failed to communicate with their own engineers, but the disparity engaged Feynman's emotions.
When describing these wildly differing estimates, Feynman briefly lapses from his damaging but dispassionate detailing of NASA's flaws to recognize the moral failing that resulted from a scientific failing: The O-rings were rubber rings designed to form a seal in the shuttle's solid rocket boosters, preventing the rockets' hot gas from escaping and damaging other parts of the vehicle.
Feynman suspected that despite NASA's claims, the O-rings were unsuitable at low temperatures and lost their resilience when cold, thus failing to maintain a tight seal when rocket pressure distorted the structure of the solid fuel booster.
Feynman's suspicions were corroborated by General Kutynaalso on the commission, who cunningly  provided Feynman with a broad hint by asking about the effect of cold on O-ring seals after mentioning that the temperature on the day of the launch was far lower than had been the case with previous launches: Inthe BBC film The Challenger revealed that the O-Ring insight had in fact come to Kutyna from the astronaut and fellow commission member Sally Ridewho had secretly provided him with NASA test results showing the O-rings became stiff when they were too cold.
He found similar failures in procedure in many other areas at NASA, but singled out its software development for praise due to its rigorous and highly effective quality control procedures — then under threat from NASA management, which wished to reduce testing to save money given that the tests had always been passed.
Feynman soon found that, while he respected the intellects of his fellow Commission members, they universally finished their criticisms of NASA with clear affirmations that the Challenger disaster should be addressed by NASA internally, but that there was no need for NASA to suspend its operations or to receive less funding.Hypothesis Tests for 1 sample Proportions 1.
Hypotheses. Write the null and alternative hypotheses you would use to test each of the following situations. Form CP – 8/01 This is a Sample Report C.L.U.E.® Personal Property How to Read Your Report C.L.U.E., the Comprehensive Loss Underwriting Exchange, is a claim history information exchange developed by ChoicePoint.
Incident/Property Damage Report 1 Incident/Property Damage Report Form (Print this form and use as a copy master.) Incident Report Please provide a brief description of the type of damage. Section II.
Inspection Findings This report is indicative of the condition of the above identified structure(s) on the date of inspection and is not to be co nstrued as a guarantee or warranty against latent, concealed, or future infestations or defects.
Based on a careful visual inspection of the readily accessible areas of the structure(s). Other types of damage and useful reports may include: cement and asphalt, decks, engineering, fire cause and origin, gutters, insulation, roofs, siding and stucco, and seismic/earthquake.
Please send an email to [email protected] if you are looking for a type of report you do not see here or would like to contribute a sample report to UP. Certified Quality Auditor (ASQ Sample Exam paper) - Download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read online.